Despite a Recent Eleventh Circuit Decision, Diversity Remains a Compelling Interest in the University Admissions Process by Kelly, David A.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 4
5-1-2002
Despite a Recent Eleventh Circuit Decision,
Diversity Remains a Compelling Interest in the
University Admissions Process
David A. Kelly
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Education Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David A. Kelly, Despite a Recent Eleventh Circuit Decision, Diversity Remains a Compelling Interest in the University Admissions Process, 17
BYU J. Pub. L. 73 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol17/iss1/4
KELLY-MACRO 2/21/2003 4:04 PM 
 
73 
Despite a Recent Eleventh Circuit Decision, Diversity 
Remains a Compelling Interest in the University 
Admissions Process 
David A. Kelly* 
“How can a society which denied the humanity of whole races of 
people, now, turn to the affected groups and ask them to compete as if 
they had always enjoyed full equality of economic and social 
opportunity, of educational preparation and political involvement?”1  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1978 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke,2 the courts have slowly chipped away 
at affirmative action policies in public universities. In Johnson v. Board 
of Regents of the University of Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit continued 
this trend by suggesting that the university’s goal of student body 
diversity is not a compelling interest sufficient to overcome a 
constitutional challenge.3 The admissions policy at issue in that case is an 
example of the sort of affirmative action programs that public 
universities have utilized for the last quarter century. These programs use 
“plus-factor” systems (in which an applicant’s minority status is only 
considered as a “plus”) to ensure diversity among students in higher 
education admissions processes. Universities that use race as a “plus” 
avoid explicit quotas and two-track admissions systems in which 
minority candidates are compared only with each other. These systems 
have been widely recognized as constitutionally acceptable ever since 
Bakke.4 
 
* Copyright © 2003 David A. Kelly, Executive Editor, U.C. Davis Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 
U.C. Davis School of Law, 2003; B.S., University of Georgia, 1998. I would like to thank Donna 
Powell for all her scholarly advice and encouragement. I am additionally grateful to Lauren Kelly for 
her love, support, and humor. 
 1. Senator Edward Brooke, Address delivered before a National Conference on the “Crisis 
in Affirmative Action,” at Georgetown Law School (May 25, 1977). Senator Brooke was the second 
African-American U.S. Senator in this nation’s history. 
 2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 3. 263 F.3d 1234, 1244-51 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 4. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that, under 
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In Bakke, the plaintiff, a white medical school applicant, charged that 
the University of California’s admission program unfairly discriminated 
against him.5 The program reserved a fixed number of spots (or 
“quotas”) for minorities and rejected the plaintiff though his test scores 
were higher than those of the minority students who were admitted.6 A 
divided U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the California medical 
school’s admissions process was unconstitutional.7 However, a different 
majority of the justices, led by Justice Powell, suggested that an 
admissions policy that considered an applicant’s minority status a “plus” 
could pass constitutional muster.8 
The basis for the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Johnson is a Supreme 
Court doctrine that requires courts to apply strict scrutiny to all 
government decisions that take race into account.9 Applying strict 
scrutiny entails a two-pronged inquiry: First, does the challenged policy 
constitute a “compelling” government interest? Second, is the policy 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest?10 Thus, the issue of whether 
student diversity is a compelling government interest is at the core of the 
debate over the continued viability of Bakke. Much of this debate centers 
on Justice Powell’s pivotal concurring opinion in that case, in which he 
found the university’s goal of attaining a diverse student body to be 
“clearly [] a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
education.”11 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected Justice Powell’s opinion as 
binding precedent, reasoning that the Justice did not speak for a majority 
of the Court.12 The Eleventh Circuit assumed for purposes of the opinion 
that student body diversity was a compelling interest and subsequently 
resolved the case on grounds that the policy was not narrowly tailored to 
 
Bakke, an example of a  constitutionally permissible admissions plan was “the Harvard plan in which 
race or ethnicity was deemed a ‘plus,’ but did not insulate a minority applicant from comparison 
with other applicants”); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) 
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001) (citing Bakke for the proposition that, “[i]n an admissions 
program dedicated to achieving a mixed student body a university may, therefore, deem race or 
ethnic background to be ‘a “plus” in a particular applicant’s file’”); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 
943 (5th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (noting that, under Bakke, “a program that 
considered a host of factors that included race would be constitutional, even if applicant’s race 
‘tipped the scales’ among qualified applicants”). 
 5. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-78. 
 6. Id. at 276-77. 
 7. Id. at 271-72. 
 8. See id. at 316-17. 
 9. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 10. See id. 
 11. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12-15 (1978). 
 12. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1249 (concluding that “Justice Powell’s opinion does not establish 
student body diversity as a compelling interest for purposes of this case”). 
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achieve diversity.13 While deciding the case on the narrowly-tailored 
prong of the strict scrutiny test, the court nevertheless engaged in a 
lengthy discussion of student body diversity as a compelling interest.14 
Despite its disclaimer that the question was an open one, in what was 
clearly dicta, the court opined that student diversity was probably not an 
interest compelling enough to survive strict scrutiny.15 In effect, the court 
signaled its belief that Bakke could no longer be counted on as 
sanctioning affirmative action policies in university admissions. 
In this Article, I propose that the Eleventh Circuit’s dictum regarding 
student body diversity sets a dangerous tone (if not precedent). In Part I 
of this Article, I discuss the facts of Johnson and the district court’s 
holding that the admissions policy was unconstitutional. Next, I explain 
the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling that the university’s admissions policy was 
not “narrowly tailored” to achieve its stated goals. I discuss the court’s 
analysis of Bakke, and its supposition that diversity is probably not a 
compelling interest. I conclude Part I with a brief look at how some of 
the other Circuits have dealt with the issue of diversity as a compelling 
interest. 
In Part II of this Article, I contend that affirmative action is still a 
viable means of remedying the effects of race-based discrimination in 
this country. With that in mind, I tackle the issue of whether a race-
conscious admissions policy can ever withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
While I do not defend the specific policy at issue in Johnson, I do 
conclude that a race-conscious policy can resist a constitutional 
challenge, provided the goal of the policy is achieving a diverse student 
body. 
II.  ELEVENTH CIRCUIT RULES PLUS-FACTOR ADMISSIONS POLICIES ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; SUGGESTS DIVERSITY NOT COMPELLING 
A.  The District Court Finds UGA’s Admissions Policy Unconstitutional 
In 1999, Jennifer L. Johnson sued the University of Georgia (UGA) 
after her application was rejected.16 She challenged the university’s 
practice of assigning point bonuses to nonwhite and male applicants, 
arguing that such a policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
 
 13. See id. at 1244-45. (The court stated, “[We] assume for purposes of this opinion only that 
UGA’s asserted interest in student body diversity is a compelling interest.” Id. at 1251). 
 14. Id. at 1244-51. 
 15. See id. at 1250-51 (noting that, though student body diversity may be compelling interest, 
weight of recent precedent is undeniably to contrary). 
 16. Id. at 1237. 
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Fourteenth Amendment.17 Her suit was subsequently consolidated with 
complaints filed by two other rejected freshman applicants, Aimee 
Bogrow and Molly Ann Beckenhauer.18 Soon after the suits were filed, 
UGA president Michael F. Adams ended the practice of awarding gender 
preferences.19 However, he left the practice of awarding bonus points to 
minorities in place for the following admissions year.20 In December 
1999, a number of black students and prospective applicants intervened 
on behalf of the university.21 
The policy in question divided the admissions process into three 
stages. At the first stage, the university automatically admitted applicants 
with an academic index (AI) and SAT score above a fixed number.22 
Likewise, those applicants with SAT and AI numbers below a certain 
number were automatically rejected.23 Applications that fell in between 
moved into stage two, where each applicant was assigned a total student 
index (TSI) number.24 This number was based on a combination of 
several weighted academic, extracurricular, demographic and other 
factors, including race.25 Applicants whose TSI scores were above a pre-
set threshold number were automatically admitted.26 White applicants 
needed at least a 4.93 to be automatically accepted; minority applicants 
needed only a 4.43.27 Those students whose TSI scores did not meet the 
threshold requirement were passed on to the third stage, where 
admissions officers evaluated students on an individual basis.28 In 
practice, a white applicant needed a TSI score of 4.66 to avoid rejection 
and reach level three; a minority applicant needed only a 4.16.29 
The University of Georgia’s admissions policy was developed after, 
and based on, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Bakke, wherein he 
wrote, “the interest in diversity is compelling in the context of a 
university’s admissions program.”30 The University maintained that 
using race in its admission process was necessary to ensure student body 
 
 17. Id. at 1238. 
 18. Id. at 1237. 
 19. Id. at 1242. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1238. 
 22. Id. at 1240. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1242. 
 28. Id. at 1240-41. 
 29. Id. at 1242. 
 30. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978). 
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diversity.31 The district court for the Southern District of Georgia, 
however, disagreed and granted summary judgment for plaintiffs.32 
Reasoning that Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bakke was not binding 
precedent, the court noted that it was not required to find that student 
body diversity constituted a compelling interest.33 The court explained 
that UGA’s articulated reason for using race in its admissions process 
was too generalized, ill-defined, and relied on stereotypical assumptions 
about members of particular races.34 Consequently, the court viewed the 
program as giving preferential treatment to minorities solely on account 
of their minority status, which it deemed clearly violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.35 
Having determined that UGA’s asserted diversity interest was not 
sufficiently compelling, the court did not reach the question of whether 
the university’s admissions process was narrowly tailored to meet that 
need.36 The court did note, however, that UGA’s articulated diversity 
interest was “so inherently formless and malleable that no plan [could] 
be narrowly tailored to fit it.”37 
B.  The Eleventh Circuit Concludes that UGA’s Policy is not Narrowly 
Tailored 
In its ruling of August 2001, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court.38 Reviewing the case de novo, the court noted that when a 
governmental entity undertakes race-conscious policies, its actions are 
subject to strict scrutiny by the courts.39 Thus, the first question the court 
had to resolve was whether student body diversity is ever a compelling 
state interest. Indicating that diversity was probably not a compelling 
interest sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny, the court assumed for 
purposes of the opinion that it was.40 Accordingly, the court moved on to 
the second prong of its analysis, determining whether UGA’s specific 
 
 31. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1244. 
 32. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D.Ga. 2000) aff’d by 
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 33. Id. at 1370-71. 
 34. Id. at 1371. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1373-74. 
 37. Id. at 1374. 
 38. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 39. Id. at 1242-43. 
 40. Id. at 1247, 1251. The court noted, “[T]he narrowest . . . common ground of the Brennan 
and Powell opinions [in Bakke] on the specific subject of student body diversity is that diversity is an 
‘important’ interest, but not the kind of compelling interest that potentially might withstand even the 
strictest constitutional scrutiny.” Id. 
KELLY-MACRO 2/21/2003  4:04 PM 
78 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
admissions policy was narrowly tailored to achieve diversity.41 The court 
identified four factors used to determine whether the admissions policy 
was indeed narrowly tailored: 
(1) [W]hether the policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way that 
does not take sufficient account of the different contributions to 
diversity that individual candidates may offer; (2) whether the policy 
fully and fairly takes account of race-neutral factors which may 
contribute to a diverse student body; (3) whether the policy gives 
arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to members of the favored racial 
groups; and (4) whether the school has genuinely considered, and 
rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for creating student 
body diversity.42 
Applying these factors to UGA’s admissions policy, the court had no 
difficulty in finding the policy unconstitutional. First, the court noted that 
at the TSI stage, the process mechanically and rigidly awarded all non-
white applicants an arbitrary bonus without considering their potential 
contribution to diversity on an individual basis.43 Thus, the court 
suggested that to avoid being invalidated, a policy could not put one 
racial group on a different and more lenient track than members of 
another group. The weight accorded race cannot be “subject to rigid or 
mechanical application,” and must remain flexible enough “to ensure that 
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that looks to 
her membership in a favored or disfavored racial group as a defining 
feature of her candidacy.”44 
Second, the court found that the TSI considered race-neutral factors 
from a standpoint that failed to account for how the activities might 
enhance the diversity of an incoming freshman class.45 The court noted 
that extracurricular and work activities, both of which reflect a student’s 
potential contribution to diversity, were only considered in a cursory 
manner by the admissions committee.46 Racial diversity may be one 
component of a diverse student body, the court reasoned, but it is not the 
only component. “If the goal in creating a diverse student body is to 
develop a university community where students are exposed to persons 
of different cultures, outlooks, and experiences, a white applicant in 
some circumstances may make a greater contribution than a non-white 
 
 41. See id. at 1251. 
 42. Id. at 1253. 
 43. Id. at 1253-54. 
 44. Id. at 1254. 
 45. Id. These factors include: economic disadvantage, travel abroad, individuals from remote 
or rural areas, “individuals who speak foreign languages”, “individuals with unique communication 
skills”, and overcoming personal adversity or social hardship. Id. at 1255. 
 46. Id. 
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applicant.”47 Thus, a policy that seeks to achieve diversity “by allowing 
some applicants to be treated more favorably than others based on race 
must ensure full and fair consideration of other, race-neutral 
characteristics that contribute to a truly diverse class of students.”48 
Third, the court reasoned that the benefit awarded minority 
applicants was “wholly, and concededly, arbitrary” because the 
university was unable to articulate a basis for the amount of the 
numerical bonus it awarded non-white candidates.49 In fact, the court 
described the bonus points awarded to minorities as selected “out of the 
blue.”50 The court also found the benefit UGA mechanically awarded 
minority applicants to be disproportionate to the very few diversity-
related factors that may permissibly be considered at the TSI stage.51 
Thus, to avoid constitutional scrutiny, a policy must use race in a way 
that does not give an arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to members of 
the favored racial groups, thereby unduly disadvantaging applicants from 
outside the favored groups who may well add more to the overall 
diversity of the student body. 
Finally, the court noted that UGA failed to present any evidence that 
it had rejected or even gave meaningful thought to substituting wholly 
race-neutral alternatives for its race-conscious admissions policy.52 Nor 
did the university offer expert testimony or other evidence establishing 
that race-neutral alternatives would be ineffective in creating a diverse 
student body.53 Accordingly, the court held, “[w]hile strict scrutiny does 
not require exhaustion of every possible alternative, it does require 
serious, good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives, either prior 
to or in conjunction with implementation of an affirmative action plan.”54 
Thus, to pass constitutional muster a university defending a race-
conscious admissions policy must show that it has genuinely considered, 
and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for creating student 
body diversity. 
 
 47. Id. at 1253. 
 48. Id. at 1254. 
 49. Id. at 1257. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1259. 
 53. Id. at 1259-60. 
 54. Id. at 1259 (citing Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1571 (11th Cir. 
1994) (citations omitted)). 
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C.  The Eleventh Circuit Indicates that Diversity is not a Compelling 
Interest 
Perhaps more important than what the Eleventh Circuit actually 
decided was what it explicitly refrained from deciding. As noted earlier, 
the court avoided resolving the question of whether student body 
diversity may ever constitute a compelling interest supporting a 
university’s use of race in its admissions process. It stated, “the 
constitutional viability of student diversity as a compelling interest is an 
open question.”55 Further, it recognized that the question, because of its 
great importance, would ultimately have to be resolved by the Supreme 
Court.56 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that some aspects of that 
issue were relevant to its own narrow tailoring analysis.57 Consequently, 
the court embarked upon a lengthy discussion of whether diversity could 
amount to a compelling interest, concluding that it probably could not.58 
The court began its analysis with reference to the Bakke decision.59 
In that case, an unsuccessful white applicant to the University of 
California at Davis Medical School challenged the school’s admissions 
program, which consisted of a general admissions system for white 
applicants and a special admissions system for minority applicants.60 A 
predetermined number of spots were reserved for minority applicants, 
irrespective of their academic status as compared to white applicants.61 
The California Supreme Court held that the university’s admissions 
system was unconstitutional, and prohibited the university from 
considering race in admissions.62 The United States Supreme Court, with 
a majority of five Justices, upheld the California Supreme Court’s 
finding that the medical school’s admissions system was 
unconstitutional. However, through an entirely different majority, the 
Court reversed the California Supreme Court’s total prohibition on the 
university’s consideration of race in its admissions process.63 
The only Justice to concur with both majority opinions was Justice 
Powell, who wrote solely for himself.64 Applying strict scrutiny, Justice 
Powell found the university’s diversity justification to be a 
 
 55. Id. at 1245. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 1245-51 (noting that recent precedent suggests diversity is not compelling). 
 59. Id. at 1245. 
 60. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 273-75 (1978). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 279-80. 
 63. Id. at 320. 
 64. Id. at 269. 
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“constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
education.”65 According to Justice Powell, a flexible admissions program 
that treats race as merely one of several factors that may be considered is 
constitutional.66 He concluded therefore, “the State has a substantial 
interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions 
program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic 
origin.”67 
In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit was quick to point out that, while 
Justice Powell plainly identified diversity as a compelling interest, no 
other Justice expressly endorsed that view.68 The court thus reasoned that 
Justice Powell’s opinion, though persuasive, was not binding authority.69 
It found that student body diversity, albeit an important interest, is not 
the kind of compelling interest that potentially might withstand the 
Court’s strict scrutiny analysis.70 “Simply put, Justice Powell’s opinion 
does not establish student body diversity as a compelling interest for 
purposes of this case.”71 The court cited to several other courts that had 
similarly concluded that Justice Powell’s opinion was not binding and 
that diversity was not a compelling interest.72 Johnson ended its 
discussion of diversity with a reminder that the Supreme Court must 
ultimately resolve the question of whether student body diversity is a 
compelling interest justifying a racial preference in university 
admissions.73 
D.  Split Circuits 
The Eleventh Circuit is the most recent Federal Court of Appeals to 
consider the continuing vitality of affirmative action programs in 
institutions of higher education.  Several other courts, most notably the 
First, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, have also weighed in on the issue, 
coming to opposite conclusions. While there is no consensus among the 
Circuits, there is an undeniable shift away from finding affirmative 
 
 65. Id. at 311-312. 
 66. Id. at 314. 
 67. Id. at 320. 
 68. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 69. Id. at 1249. 
 70. See id. at n.13. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (referencing Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) cert. 
denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2001), 
rev’d, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002); and Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. 
FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
 73. Id. at 1250. 
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action programs in university admissions processes constitutionally 
kosher. 
In 1996, the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas rejected any and all 
forms of racial classification in university admissions.74 Reasoning that 
Supreme Court decisions since Bakke have indicated that diversity is not 
a compelling interest, the court held that, not only was Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion not binding, but it had been superseded by more 
recent rulings.75 The court also argued that racial indicators were not 
necessarily a predictor of student body diversity. Writing for the panel, 
Judge Smith reasoned, “[U]se of race, in and of itself, to choose students 
simply achieves a student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no 
more rational on its own terms than would be choices based upon the 
physical size or blood type of applicants.”76 
In Wessmann v. Gittens, a case similar to Hopwood, the First Circuit 
held that a Boston private school’s affirmative action program was 
unconstitutional.77 In Wessmann, the school’s admissions policy was to 
reserve half of its seats for students who scored high on standardized 
tests, while the other half was reserved to reflect the racial composition 
of qualified applicants.78 The school reasoned that its policy was 
necessary to maintain diversity and remedy past discrimination.79 The 
court rejected this rationale, concluding that the policy amounted 
essentially to a quota system and that past findings of discrimination did 
not justify the school’s race-conscious admissions policy.80 
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit, in Smith v. University of Washington Law 
School, came to the opposite conclusion.81 Referencing Bakke, the court 
noted that Washington has a legitimate and substantial interest in 
ameliorating the disabling effects of past discrimination.82 The court 
expressly identified Justice Powell’s opinion as binding and held that 
“educational diversity is a compelling governmental interest that meets 
the demands of strict scrutiny of race-conscious measures.”83 
Acknowledging that post-Bakke Supreme Court decisions have not 
looked upon race-conscious policies with much favor, the court pointed 
 
 74. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
 75. Id. at 942-45. 
 76. Id. at 945. 
 77. 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 78. Id. at 793. 
 79. Id. at 797, 800. 
 80. Id. at 799, 802-05. 
 81. 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 82. Id. at 1197, 1201 (citing Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)). 
 83. Id. at 1201. 
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out that none of those decisions concerned university admissions.84 It 
concluded that, until the Supreme Court indicates otherwise, it would 
continue to assume that Justice Powell’s approach was still binding 
authority.85 
Similarly, in the most recent decision addressing this issue, a sharply 
divided Sixth Circuit upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s 
admissions policy that used race and other factors as “potential ‘plus’ 
factors.”86 The court spilled considerable ink detailing why Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion in Bakke was still binding.87 The court 
concluded that, “[b]ecause Justice Powell’s opinion is binding on this 
court . . . the Law School has a compelling interest in achieving a diverse 
student body.”88 Moreover, the court held that the admissions policy was 
narrowly tailored to achieve student body diversity and thus withstood 
strict scrutiny.89 The opinion explicitly rejected Johnson’s suggestion 
that Justice Powell did not deem student body diversity a compelling 
interest, noting that, under that rationale, Justice Powell never would 
have joined “in the Court’s decision to permit ‘the competitive 
consideration of race and ethnicity.’”90 
This recent spate of conflicting federal court rulings could soon lead 
the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider Bakke. Although the Court 
declined to review Hopwood, either Smith, Johnson, or Bollinger may 
provide the Court the appropriate vehicle to finally resolve the issue of 
whether diversity justifies a race-conscious admissions policy.91 If and 
when the Supreme Court revisits Bakke, it will inevitably have to resolve 
the question of whether student body diversity is an interest compelling 
enough to survive strict scrutiny. 
 
 84. Id. at 1200. 
 85. Id. at 1200-1201. The court stated: “Thus, at our level of the judicial system Justice 
Powell’s opinion remains the law.” Id. at 1201. 
 86. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 746 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 87. See id. at 738-48. 
 88. Id. at 739. 
 89. Id. at 752 (holding that the court was “satisfied that the admissions policy is sensitive to 
the possibility that it might someday have satisfied its purpose” of ensuring student body diversity). 
 90. Id. at 742, n.6 (citing Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Bakke) 
 91. The Supreme Court declined to review Hopwood. See 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
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III.  ADMISSIONS POLICIES SEEKING TO ENSURE STUDENT BODY 
DIVERSITY PROMOTE GOOD PUBLIC POLICY AND ENRICH QUALITY OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
A.   Affirmative Action Remains Effective Remedy for Discrimination 
Higher education is sacrosanct in this country. As the epicenter of 
creative and original thought, it should be reserved for no one and open 
to anyone. In particular, it should be a viable and worthwhile option for 
minorities, who have historically been denied educational and 
employment opportunities.92 A tool to aid in this endeavor is affirmative 
action, a policy that seeks to eliminate barriers that have kept minorities 
and women out of the educational mainstream.93 Yet affirmative action 
has come under attack the last few decades.94 There are those who 
believe that the policy tends to perpetuate, rather than eliminate, existing 
disparities between minorities and the majority population.95 This 
argument, however, is unavailing in light of the manifold benefits of 
affirmative action. 
In the first place, affirmative action has, if nothing else, alerted 
society to the difficulties minorities face in their attempts to enter higher 
education and the job market.96 Even the current debate over the 
program’s continued vitality breathes new life in the subject of racial 
inequality in this country. Moreover, affirmative action embodies the 
ideal that diversity in the university and workplace is of paramount 
importance to Americans. After all, our nation’s motto, e pluribus unum 
(“from the many, one”), suggests that it is our individual differences that 
make us stronger as a nation.97 One needs look no further than the 
 
 92. Even today, minorities are underrepresented in higher education. For example, African-
Americans comprise over 13% of the American population, but receive less than 7.5% of the law 
degrees. See Ryan Fortson, Comment: Affirmative Action, The Bell Curve, and Law School 
Admissions, 24 SEATTLE UNIV.L. REV. 1087, 1111-13 (2001). Hispanics suffer even greater under 
representation. See id. 
 93. See J. Clay Smith, Article: Open Letter to the President On Race and Affirmative Action, 
42 HOW. L.J. 27, 28 (1998). 
 94. For a brief overview of arguments for and against affirmative action in university 
admissions, see generally Constance Hawke, Reframing the Rationale for Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education Admissions Decisions, 135 EDUC. L. REP. 1, Aug. 1999. 
 95. See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury, Incentive Effects of Affirmative Action, 523 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 19, 20 (1992). Loury notes that critics of affirmative action argue that, for 
example, if an employer believes his minority workers to be less skilled than majority workers he 
will be less likely to assign them to high-level positions. See id. at 20-21. As a result, the majority 
workers will view the minority workers as inferior, and will treat them as such. See id. 
 96. See Smith, supra note 93, at 44-45. 
 97. See Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Bakke Seriously: Distinguishing Diversity from 
Affirmative Action in the Law School Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1497 (1999) 
(noting that our national motto “suggests both the irrelevance and the relevance of our differences”). 
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President’s own Cabinet to appreciate how America celebrates 
diversity.98 
The fact remains, however, that discrimination based on race 
continues to exist in our country.99 I submit that affirmative action is still 
an effective means of remedying the effects of race-based discrimination 
in this country. However, I also recognize that the program is only as 
effective as the policies that promote and implement it. Thus, in the 
educational context, it is imperative that policies aimed at increasing the 
access minorities have to institutions of higher learning are not deemed 
automatically unconstitutional. These policies must be examined in light 
of the objective of a diverse student body. 
B.  Diversity Serves as Compelling Interest Sufficient to Overcome 
Constitutional Challenge 
Many people who support diversity oppose racial diversity as a poor 
substitute for whatever characteristics constitute diversity.100 While it is 
true that racial diversity is not the same thing as diversity in general, it is 
equally true that it is a significant feature marking diversity. Diversity in 
general encompasses an assortment of individual characteristics, such as 
the ability to speak fluent Latin or run a four-minute mile. These 
individuals, regardless of their race, certainly add diversity to a 
university student body, consequently enhancing the quality of the 
student body. Similarly, a diversity of ethnic and racial students enhances 
the quality of the student body. This is because students benefit from an 
exposure to a variety of perspectives, ideologies, and cultures. Students 
of all races benefit by being exposed to future Michael Jordans, Amy 
Tans, and Colin Powells.101 
Those who oppose any consideration of race in college admissions 
argue that preferentially treating one race over another is simply reverse 
discrimination. I agree. However, I do not concede that all race-
conscious admissions policies prefer one race to the exclusion of another. 
A policy that merely recognizes race as an important factor in student 
body diversity is not per se discriminatory. An example is in order. 
Suppose the University of California-Davis School of Law (King 
Hall) seeks to admit one hundred students.102 The law school receives 
 
 98. President Bush’s Cabinet consists of several women, an Asian-American, a Latino, and 
two African-Americans. 
 99. See supra note 87. 
 100. See Loewy, supra note 97, at 1486. 
 101. See Loewy, supra note 97, at 1489 (noting that students of all races ought to be exposed 
to the likes of Clarence Thomas and Thurgood Marshall). 
 102. This illustration is based in large part on an example used by Professor Loewy, supra 
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over one thousand applications, only fifty of which are from African-
American applicants. The school has an admissions policy by which it 
fills 90% of its class with applicants having only the highest GPA and 
LSAT scores. It reserves the remaining 10% to those students it believes 
will ensure the most student body diversity. The school has selected the 
ninety most meritorious students, a population consisting of eighty-seven 
Caucasians and only three African-Americans.103 Among those 
applicants competing for the final ten spots are Brandon Leader, an 
African-American with a 3.2 GPA from Harvard and a 155 LSAT, and 
Ronald Holley, a Caucasian with a 3.5 GPA from Harvard and a 160 
LSAT.104 
At first glance, Ronald may seem the obvious choice. After all, his 
grades and test scores are higher than Brandon’s, seemingly indicating a 
greater likelihood of success in law school. He would certainly appear to 
be the “better” candidate. Or would he? If what has been argued thus far 
has any merit, it is fair to say that Brandon will likely enhance the quality 
of the student body in a way that Ronald cannot. While it is true that both 
Brandon and Ronald bring a distinct perspective, in a law class of only 
three African Americans, it is fair to say that Brandon’s is more 
unique.105 Thus, Brandon adds to the student body diversity, enriching 
the educational experience of all the other students. Unless Ronald can 
demonstrate that academic scores are the sole measure of merit in law 
school admissions, he does not have a constitutional right to be selected 
over Brandon.106 If admissions were solely based on GPA and LSAT 
scores there would be no need for an admissions committee—a computer 
could do all the work. 
The fact is, however, that admissions committees have the right (if 
not the obligation) to seek to ensure that the student body is as diverse 
and multi-faceted as possible. King Hall wants the best candidates, which 
are not necessarily the highest achievers. To accomplish this, the school 
 
note 97. Professor Loewy’s example involves a law school seeking to fill its 200th and last spot in the 
entering class. The school has to choose between an African-American candidate and a Caucasian 
candidate. The African-American student has a lower GPA and LSAT score, but would be only the 
tenth black student in the class. Professor Loewy reasons that while the Caucasian student may have 
better test scores and grades, the school ought to consider other relevant factors, such as diversity, in 
determining which student to admit. He concludes, “Because I do not think that it is unfair to count 
race for the purpose of creating an institution that better educates its students, I have no problem 
with the fairness of choosing [the Africa-American candidate] over [the Caucasian candidate].” See 
id. at 1495. 
 103. For simplicity sake, I am ignoring all other ethnic groups that would certainly be present 
in any law class UC-Davis admits. 
 104. For simplicity sake, I am also assuming that both Brandon and Ronald share all other 
qualities, i.e., that one is no better than the other at a sport or anything else. 
 105. Again, this is assuming they are equal in every other respect. 
 106. See Loewy, supra note 97, at 1500. 
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must have the discretion to select those candidates it deems most 
beneficial to the quality of the student body. In the example I have given, 
Brandon would probably beat out Ronald. It is important to point out, 
however, that the school’s selection of Brandon instead of Ronald is not 
based on a policy of favoring African-Americans over Caucasians. 
Rather, it is based on a policy favoring the law school as a whole.107 The 
primary beneficiaries of this admissions decision are the already ninety 
chosen students, eighty-seven of whom are Caucasian. While it is true 
that in this particular law class, being African-American is an advantage, 
that will not always be the case.108 If, for example, Ronald was a retired 
schoolteacher from Iceland, he might be preferred over Brandon (even if 
Brandon’s scores were higher) because of the unique perspective he 
brings to the student body. 
Thus, a race-conscious admissions policy that does not favor any 
particular race, but rather seeks to maximize student diversity, does not 
necessarily run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court 
has stated that the Fourteenth Amendment protects persons, not 
groups.109 Accordingly, race (a group classification) “should be subjected 
to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal 
protection of the laws has not been infringed.”110 In the example set forth 
here, each student is analyzed not as a member of a racial group, but 
rather as an individual. Each student’s relevant individual attributes are 
weighed in accordance with the university’s needs. In the original 
example, in a predominantly Caucasian class, Brandon had an advantage 
over Ronald because he was African-American. But in the subsequent 
example, Ronald had the advantage by being a retired schoolteacher 
from another country. 
The model admissions policy set forth herein, in contrast to the 
policy invalidated by the Eleventh Circuit, also has the advantage of 
being narrowly tailored to achieve student body diversity. In Johnson, 
the university’s admissions policy mechanically awarded every minority 
candidate a “diversity” bonus, while severely limiting the range of other 
factors relevant to diversity that could be considered. As the court 
correctly stated, this sort of policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve the 
goal of overall student body diversity.111 In contrast, the policy I have 
 
 107. See Loewy, supra note 97, at 1493 (noting than an admissions process favoring best 
athletes may appear to be “male-favoring,” but in reality is only “institution-favoring”). 
 108. See id. 
 109. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) rev’d by 528 U.S. 216 
(2000). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1251 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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advocated allows for an individual determination of which students most 
enrich the quality of education offered at the university. This sort of race-
conscious admissions policy does not necessarily impose inequalities and 
is in strict accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit’s suggestion in Johnson that diversity is not a 
compelling interest sufficient to withstand a constitutional challenge 
deals a crippling blow to affirmative action policies aimed at remedying 
the effects of racial inequity in this country. The decision will serve to 
deter universities from relying on Bakke to legitimize their goal of 
attaining diversity and equal opportunity.112 This will lead to reduced 
minority enrollment in institutions of higher education and a concomitant 
rise in disparate allocation of benefits and opportunities. 
I contend that a race-conscious admissions policy can withstand 
constitutional scrutiny if that policy is aimed at achieving a diverse 
student body. This sort of policy is not automatically unconstitutional 
because it does not discriminate against any particular racial group or 
classification. If the policy merely allows for individual determinations 
of which students most enrich the quality of education offered at a given 
university, it does not run afoul of the Constitution. 
 
 
 112. This is evidenced by UGA’s new “interim admissions policy”, announced just a short 
time ago. This policy only takes scholastic factors into consideration for freshman admissions and 
abandons any effort to achieve student body diversity. This is an unfortunate consequence of 
decisions like Johnson. 
